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Abstract—2D barcodes have enjoyed a significant penetration rate in mobile applications. This is largely due to the extremely low
barrier to adoption – almost every camera-enabled smartphone can scan 2D barcodes. As an alternative to NFC technology, 2D
barcodes have been increasingly used for security-sensitive mobile applications including mobile payments and personal identification.
However, the security of barcode-based communication in mobile applications has not been systematically studied. Due to the visual
nature, 2D barcodes are subject to eavesdropping when they are displayed on the smartphone screens. On the other hand, the
fundamental design principles of 2D barcodes make it difficult to add security features. In this paper, we propose SBVLC - a secure
system for barcode-based visible light communication (VLC) between smartphones. We formally analyze the security of SBVLC based
on geometric models and propose physical security enhancement mechanisms for barcode communication by manipulating screen
view angles and leveraging user-induced motions. We then develop three secure data exchange schemes that encode information in
barcode streams. These schemes are useful in many security-sensitive mobile applications including private information sharing,
secure device pairing, and contactless payment. SBVLC is evaluated through extensive experiments on both Android and iOS
smartphones.
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F
1 INTRODUCTION
S Hort-range communication technologies including Near FieldCommunication (NFC) and 2D barcodes have enabled many
popular smartphone applications such as contactless payments,
mobile advertisements, and data sharing. Evolved from the ra-
dio frequency identification (RFID) technology, NFC can enable
reliable low-power communication between RF tags and read-
ers. However, NFC requires additional hardware and has been
supported by only about a dozen of smartphone platforms on
the market. Recent studies have shown that NFC is subject to
security vulnerabilities such as eavesdropping and jamming. In
addition, many types of active attacks, such as data corruption,
relay attack [2] and man-in-the-middle attack [3] also have been
exploited on NFC-enabled portable devices.
Compared with NFC, 2D barcodes have enjoyed a significantly
higher penetration rate in mobile applications. This is largely due
to the extremely low barrier to adoption – almost every camera-
enabled smartphone can read and process 2D barcodes. As an
alternative to NFC, 2D barcodes have been increasingly used for
security-sensitive applications including payments and personal
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identification. For instance, PayPal recently rolled out a barcode-
based payment service for retail customers [4]. As one of the
handy features of iPhone series, the Passbook App stores tickets,
coupons, and gift/loyalty cards using scannable barcodes.
However, the security of barcode-based communication in
mobile applications has not been systematically studied. Due to
the visual nature, 2D barcodes are subject to eavesdropping when
they are displayed on the smartphone screens. The proliferation
of smartphones in turn puts a portable camera in everyone’s
pocket, making eavesdropping significantly easier. This is exac-
erbated by wide spread use of surveillance cameras in public
areas like shopping malls. On the other hand, the fundamental
design principles of 2D barcodes make it difficult to add security
features. First, a 2D barcode only contains a very limited amount
of information and hence cannot adopt advanced encryption primi-
tives. Moreover, most existing barcode applications are based on a
single barcode exchange, which is insufficient to establish a secure
communication channel. Recently, several systems are designed to
stream a series of barcodes between a LCD screen and smartphone
camera [5], [6]. These systems can enable high-throughput ad
hoc communication between smartphones without relying on the
Internet connectivity. However, they are designed based on highly
customized barcodes which are not widely adopted in practice.
In this paper, we investigate secure barcode-based communica-
tion for smartphones. We design a new system that can stream QR
codes between smartphones at a throughput comparable to that of
state-of-art NFC systems. Due to the inherent directionality, the
visible light communication (VLC) channel of barcode exchanges
yields some interesting security properties. We formally analyze
the security of VLC based on geometric models and propose
physical security enhancement mechanisms such as manupilating
2view angles and leveraging user-induced motions. Based on our
security analysis, we develop three secure data exchange protocols
that encode information in barcode streams. We believe such
protocols are useful in many mobile applications including private
information sharing, secure device pairing, and contactless mobile
payment, etc.
Contributions. We propose SBVLC (Secure Barcode-based
Visible Light Communication) – a novel secure ad-hoc wireless
communication system for smartphones. Unlike NFC, SBVLC
can be widely adopted by most off-the-shelf smartphones. It
works across various smartphone platforms equipped with a color
screen and a front-facing camera. Our system can also be easily
extended to support other mobile and portable devices such as
laptops and tablets. We use rigorous 2D and 3D geometric models
to thoroughly examine the security of the proposed system. To
the best of our knowledge, this work is the first that focuses
on modelling and analyzing the security of VLC channel and
barcode-based communication between smartphones. Specifically,
we first design a real-time duplex screen-camera VLC channel
based on 2D barcode streaming. By embedding extra information
into the color of Quick Response (QR) codes, we developed a
fast QR filtering technique to quickly remove the non-QR and
duplicate QR frame images. On top of the duplex VLC channel,
we further propose three secure communication schemes.
1) Two-phase message transfer scheme. It is designed for
smartphones to opportunistically exchange data such as
contracts and photos. It is ultra lightweight and without
using any complex cryptographic building blocks.
2) Smartphone handshake scheme. It is developed for the
standard key-exchange-then-encryption paradigm. The
scheme serves as an alternative key exchange protocol
to the conventional DH key exchange protocol1. The
established key can be used later for many security
applications.
3) All-or-nothing data streaming scheme. It is tailored for
secure temporary data transfer without the key exchange
phase. The scheme utilizes all-or-nothing transformation
to enhance the channel security — it preserves the confi-
dentiality of all the transmitted data, if the eavesdropper
misses at least one barcode frame during the entire
communication.
All the proposed schemes are evaluated through extensive ex-
periments on both Android and iOS smartphone platforms. The
benchmark result shows that the SBVLC achieves high level
security and NFC-comparable throughput.
Road Map. The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 introduces the system architecture and preliminaries.
In Section 3, we give 2D and 3D geometric security models. In
Section 4, we enable a real-time one-way screen-camera VLC
channel based on color QR codes. In Section 5, we propose various
physical protection approaches; we then develop and analyze three
secure communication schemes: (a) two-phase message transfer
scheme; (b) smartphone handshake scheme; (c) all-or-nothing
1. The proposed key exchange protocol is post-quantum secure, while the
conventional DH key exchange will be immediately broken once large enough
quantum computers are available. NB: we do not claim the efficiency advantage
of our key exchange protocol over the DH key exchange protocol. In fact,
since their security assumptions are not comparable, it is hard to determine an
equivalent security parameter of the DH protocol for a meaningful efficiency
comparison.
data streaming scheme. In Section 6, we study the compatibility,
usability and robustness of SBVLC system. Finally, Section 7
summaries related work, and a conclusion is given in Section 8.
2 PRELIMINARIES
Barcode-based communication. 1D/2D barcodes are widely used
to transfer information through optical machine-readable patterns.
Nowadays, most off-the-shelf smartphones can read and display
barcodes, such as UPC code [7], QR codes [8] and Data Ma-
trix [9]. In particular, QR code was invented in 1994 and approved
as ISO/IEC 18004 in 2000. The standard QR code has 40 different
versions, ranging from 21 × 21 to 177 × 177 modules. QR
codes have build-in error correction code (ECC), and there are
4 error correcting levels – L (7%), M (15%), Q (25%), H(30%),
respectively. To ensure readability to legacy smartphones, only
QR codes up to version 10 are mostly used in practice. A
single QR code with version 10 can only store 271 characters
using ‘L’ ECC level. For many emerging applications, one QR
code is not enough, which could severely hinder its adoption in
such applications. It is also the case that existing barcode-based
communication systems are easily subject to attacks for its visual
nature. We would like to address these issues in this work.
Design Goal and SBVLC architecture. Our goal is to enable
secure barcode-based communication between smartphones. The
focus is to achieve data confidentiality against eavesdropping.
Designed for off-the-shelf smartphone platforms, SBVLC should
be lightweight. For example, it is implausible to establish a secure
channel for a single-barcode communication with overhead of
multiple-round barcode exchange. In addition, we want to avoid
any unnecessary cryptographic assumptions. We note that the
security of NFC relies on Diffie-Hellman key exchange [10], [11],
which is easy to break using quantum computers.
The communication mode of SBVLC is ad-hoc in that the
sender and the receiver are not expected to have a common shared
secret knowledge such as secret key in priori to the communica-
tion. Similar to NFC setting, there is an air interface between the
sender and the receiver, and the typical reception distance is also a
few inches. As shown in Fig. 1 (a) and (b), SBVLC supports secure
data exchange for both smartphone-smartphone and smartphone-
terminal scenarios. SBVLC works on top of a fully duplex VLC
channel, and thus the smartphones must be equipped with a color
screen and a front-facing camera as the sender and the receiver
are required to ‘talk’ to each other simultaneously. SBVLC works
among various mobile platforms without specific requirement on
the screen size and camera resolution, but a better specification
usually leads to higher communication throughput.
VLC channel model. We now give the formal definition
of a smartphone VLC channel. Fig. 1 (b) illustrates the VLC
channel model, and the parameters are defined as follows. The
receiver distance to the source is d and the receiver aperture radius
is r. The angle from the source-receiver line and the receiver
normal is denoted α1 and to the source beam axis is denoted
α2, which is also known as the viewing angle. In our context,
a one-way smartphone VLC channel consists of a transmitter
(realized by a smartphone screen) and a receiver (realized by a
smartphone front-facing camera); barcodes are used as the channel
coding schemes. In order to achieve real-time communication, the













(b) VLC Channel Model.
Fig. 1: SBVLC System Architecture and Channel Model.
3 SECURITY MODEL
Successful defense against eavesdropping vastly depends on care-
ful analysis of the attack scenarios and adopting suitable protection
mechanisms based on the analysis. Before presenting our secure
communication schemes, we would like to build formal 2D and 3D
geometric security models and study several physical protection
mechanisms in this section. The 3D model reflects the situation in
reality, but the 2D model is also useful and intuitive, because we
can always take a projection map P : R3 → R2 and project all
the objects onto a plane, e.g. by taking the projection matrix
P =
 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 0
 ,
we can map any point (x, y, z) in the 3D space R3 to a point
(x, y, 0) as its projection on the x-y plane, which is the plane
parallel to the ground.
We now present the 2D/3D geometric model of a smartphone
screen. The typical screen size of a mainstream smartphone
platform is between 3 and 6 inches. One important feature of a
smartphone screen addressed in our model is its visible angle.
A 2D screen model with visible angle 2θmax is depicted in
Fig. 2 (a), where the screen is represented as an interval, and
the vertex of the screen visible angle is located at the origin
O. Let θmax = 90◦ − ε, where ε ∈ [0◦, 90◦]. Notice that
the smartphone screen visible angles become increasingly wide
along with the development of display technology. Current record
holder, Samsung super AMOLED screen can achieve 176◦ visible
angle; namely, ε = 90− 1762 = 2◦. Since ε is usually small, given
a typical smartphone screen size, the distance between O and the
screen center is less than 0.1 inch. Considering this distance is
negligible to an adversary who is far away, we ignore the tiny
difference between O and the screen center.
Similarly, the screen can be modelled as a plane that passes
through the origin in the 3D model. We describe the screen
orientation by quantifying its normal vector v ∈ R3. As shown in
Fig. 2 (b), such plane is uniquely determined by its normal vector
v, so we denote the screen plane as pl(v). In order to address the
notion of visibility, we define the visible zone in the 2D/3D model
as follows.
Definition Let t ∈ {2, 3}. Let v ∈ Rt be a normal vector and
ε ∈ [0◦, 90◦] be an angle. The visible zone of the screen plane




∣∣∣∣ v · u||v||2 · ||u||2 ≥ sin(ε)
}
.
According to this definition, if a receiver is at location
a ∈ Vist(v, ε), then the receiver is able to capture information


















(c) 3D visible zone.
Fig. 2: Screen Model and Visible Zone.
factor is not taken into account in our notion of visibility. The
transmission rate decreases along with the increase of the distance
between the transmitter and the receiver for a typical VLC channel.
However, similar to the distance factor in the case of NFC, it
only offers a fuzzy security guarantee, because it is hard to make
assumptions on the attackers’ devices. For the sake of uniformity,
we don’t differentiate the visibility in terms of distance, which
only increases the soundness of our security claim.
3.1 2D/3D screen geometric model
Single-receiver adversarial model. In the single-receiver ad-
versarial model, the eavesdropper uses only one optical receiver
during an attack event. This is the most common attack scenario
in practice: a curious eavesdropper first occasionally discovers a
VLC event, and he/she then tries to eavesdrop the communication
with his/her carried optical receiver, e.g. a camera or a smartphone.
Without loss of generality, the optical sensors of those receivers
can be in arbitrarily sharp; in the t-D model, t ∈ {2, 3}, for a
given optical sensor D ⊆ Rt, there exists a point a0 ∈ Rt such
that D ⊆ B(a0, r) with a minimum radius r ∈ R, where B(·, ·)
denotes a ball. The adversarial receiver is represented by the ball
B(a0, r) in our security analysis, and we note that the adversarial
capability is (presumably) increased by this approximation. We
assume that the shooting angle of the adversarial receiver can be
optimized instantly during an attack; namely the angle α1 = 0 in
Fig. 1 (b). Whereas, we don’t consider the case that an adversary
can physically move his/her receiver a long distance away from its
initial position during a short period of time. Hence, position of the
adversarial receiver is supposed to be fixed during eavesdropping.
As shown in Fig. 3 (a), the adversary’s receiver can be repre-
sented as an interval with length 2r in the 2D model. Let the phone
screen be at the origin O, and the distance between the screen and
the adversary’s receiver is d = ||a0||2. One can easily deduce the
adversary’s capture cone aperture as 2β = 2 · arctan ( rd). Recall
that the distance d does not affect the eavesdropping successful
rate in our security model. Therefore, in rest of this paper, we
only quantify the adversary by the angle β and the position
a0 when r and d parameters are not important in the context.
Denote the single-receiver adversary as Advs(a0, β). We define
the adversarial capture cone of Advs(a0, β) in 2D/3D model as:
Definition Let t ∈ {2, 3}. The adversarial capture cone of a




∣∣∣∣ u · a0||u||2 · ||a0||2 ≥ cos(β)
}
.
Clearly, all the source beam emitted from the origin O that
lies inside the adversarial capture cone ct(a0, β) can be captured
by the single-receiver adversary Advs(a0, β). Therefore, we can


















(b) 3D single-rcvr adv model.
Fig. 3: Single-receiver adversarial model.
Definition Let t ∈ {2, 3}. We say that the screen is visible to a
single-receiver adversary Advs(a0, β), if and only if
Vist(v, ε) ∩ ct(a0, β) 6= ∅ .
3.2 2D/3D adversarial geometric model
The radius r is usually very small for a smartphone camera.
Whenever r is negligible with respect to d, we have β ≈ 0. We
refer this special type of single-receiver adversary Advs(a0, 0) as
single-point adversary.
Multi-receiver adversarial model. We now model a more
powerful type of adversaries, who are able to control multiple
optical receivers to launch an attack. We begin with two-receiver
adversary, and Fig. 8 illustrates the situation in the 2D/3D model.
There are a gap with angle γ (on the a0-a1 plane) between two







− β0 − β1 .
Denote Advm(a0, β0,a1, β1, γ) as the two-receiver adversary. In
App. A, we reduce a two-receiver (or multi-receiver) adversary to
a single-receiver adversary. (c.f. Thm. A.1.)
4 ENABLING THE SBVLC CHANNEL FOR SMART-
PHONES
4.1 Channel coding scheme design
First of all, we need to enable a one-way real-time VLC channel
between smartphones. We emphasis that all kinds of 1D and 2D
barcodes can be the channel coding candidate. Our prototype
adopts QR code due to its advantages over other conventional
barcodes, including high information density per code and low
sensitivity to varying lighting conditions and angles. As depicted
in Fig. 4, the barcode streaming system runs between a sender
and a receiver. At the beginning of a data transmission, the
sender divides the data string into several data chunks. The size
of each data chunk depends on the system parameters such as
the maximum storage capacity of a single barcode and the error
correcting rate of the employed error correcting coded (ECC) such
as the classic Reed-Solomon (RS) codes.
Let `max be the maximum package size, which is the maximum
raw string length that a single barcode can store before ECC
encoding. The data chunk size is the payload size `p = `max− 16
bits. The package is then encoded by ECC to a frame block, which
is then processed to generate a barcode. The prepared barcodes are




















Fig. 4: 2D Barcode Streaming.
refresh rate. The receiver starts the decoding process as soon as
the first barcode frame is captured by its front-facing camera. The
successful barcode decoding process outputs a frame string, which
is then decoded by ECC decoded to a package. Finally, the data
string is assembled from those received data chunks.
4.2 System Integration
Determining the optimal system parameters. SBVLC uses
the 8-bit binary mode (mode indicator ‘0100’) for QR code
generation. The main system parameters that need to be decided
includes the QR version, error correction level and frame refresh
rate. In order to determine the proper ECC level, we did statistical
test from QR version 1 to 20 on iPhone 4S, Google Nexus S
and Samsung Galaxy S3. The result shows that low (‘L’) ECC
level is sufficient in our usage scenario, and there is no correlation
between the barcode decoding success rate and the error correction
level even for high QR versions. Hence, we pick low (‘L’) ECC
level for better storage capacity per barcode. Each data chunk is
formatted to a package by adding a 16-bit sequence number in the
header.
In order to achieve a real-time system, we must ensure that
each barcode can be encoded and decoded on time. The charts in
Fig. 5 show the performance evaluation of single-thread encoding
and decoding running time tested on both Nexus S and Galaxy S3.
Compared with the encoding running time, the decoding running
time grows slower along with the increase of QR versions. This is
because high quality QR frame image can be easily decoded with
very few errors; subsequently, the ECC-decoding step becomes
much faster than the ECC-encoding step.
In order to determine the proper frame refresh rate, we
first tested the screen refresh rate and camera capture rate. Our
experiment shows that the average time taken to refresh a QR
frame screen is roughly the same on different platforms, ranging
from 20 to 22 ms. Hence, displaying QR codes is not the system
bottleneck unless the frame refresh rate is above 40 frames per
second (FPS). In practice, the major challenges are brought by
the low camera capture rate. Our system prototype fetches camera
image preview using standard callback API on Android systems
and avcapturesession API on iOS systems. The corresponding
image capture rates of the front-facing cameras with image size
640×480 on Nexus S, Galaxy S3 and iPhone 4S are 8.3, 25.4 and
30.3 FPS, respectively. We observe that the camera capture rate
of a legacy device might be very low, e.g. Nexus S. Since SBVLC
requires a fully duplex two-way VLC communication between





























































Fig. 5: QR barcode streaming performance.
smartphones, the front-facing camera capture rate is crucial. We
did channel robustness test to determine the frame refresh rate
cap, and the left chart in Fig. 6 illustrates the probability that
the receiver (front-facing camera) captures all the QR frames
displayed by a sender under different frame refresh rates. The
result confirms our conjecture that the ideal frame refresh rate cap
τmax should be half of the camera capture rate. Denote tenc(i) and
tdec(i) be the average encoding and decoding running time (in
seconds) of a version-i QR code. We can estimate the ideal frame
refresh rate as







Constructing fast QR filtering. Since the frame refresh rate
cap is about half of the camera capture rate, it is expected to
have multiple camera frame images for the same QR code. So
we have to construct an efficient filter to remove duplicated QR
frame images. Secondly, the filter should also be able to remove
those images that does not contain a QR code before submitting
them for decoding. In this section, we propose a novel fast QR
filtering technique to remove those non-QR and duplicated QR
frame images with only a few image pixel samples.
We utilize the color screen of a smartphone, and let the
sender display the QR codes in blue and red alternating order





















































Fig. 6: Channel robustness and QR streaming throughput.
such that any two consecutive QR codes are in different colors.
Therefore, we can embed extra information into the colors of the
QR codes while maintaining the traditional QR code functionality.
Once the receiver captures a frame image, it randomly picks
N pixel samples in the central area of the image. According
to the RGB value of each pixel, the receiver then classifies the
pixels into three bins: ‘blue’, ‘red’ and ‘others’. The receiver
Algorithm 1: FrameClassifier({pi}Ni=1 , σ)
R = 0; B = 0;
for i← 1 to N do
if ||pi − pr||1 < σ then
R++;
if ||pi − pb||1 < σ then
B++;
if R > 0 ∩B = 0 then
return ‘Red’;



























Fig. 7: Fast QR filtering.
will then make decisions based on the weight of those bins. Let
pi = [Ri, Gi, Bi]
T be the RGB vector of the i-th sampled pixel.
Define the RGB vectors of red and blue as pr = [255, 0, 0]T and
pb = [0, 0, 255]
T respectively. Denote σ as a threshold value, and
let ||x||1 be the L1 norm of the vector x. As described in Alg. 1,
the classifier will return ‘Red’, ‘Blue’ or ‘None’, indicating that
the image contains a red QR code, a blue QR code or no QR code,
respectively. In the context of our system, no QR code means there
is no red or blue QR code.
We set the parameter N = 80 and run experiments to
determine the proper threshold σ. The 3D bar chart of Fig. 7
shows the weights of ‘red’ and ‘blue’ bins for different threshold
values. The first pair of red and blue rows depict the weights of
‘red’ and ‘blue’ bins when test images contain no QR code; the
second and third pairs of red and blue rows depict the weights
of ‘red’ and ‘blue’ bins when test images contain red QR codes
and blue QR codes, respectively. We found that both ‘red’ and
‘blue’ bins are constantly empty when the test images contain no
QR code, even with threshold σ = 150. The classifier fails to
correctly detect the ‘red’ color when σ ≤ 70, but the weight of
‘red’ bin catches up quickly along with the increase of threshold.
Aftermath, we select σ = 110 to tolerate the chromatic aberration
caused by different smartphones’ display screens and cameras.
Our empirical result shows that our classifier can distinguish a
image that contains no QR, a red QR or a blue QR with 100%
accuracy. Its JAVA implementation on Android systems runs less
than 0.1 ms on all tested smartphone platforms. Equipped with
this classifier, the receiver is able to quickly filter the duplicated
QR images with nearly zero computational overhead by removing
the following QR images in the same color.
Channel realization We implemented the system on both


















(b) 3D multi-rcvr adv model.
Fig. 8: Multi-receiver adversarial model.
QR library [12]. We set the frame refresh cap τmax as 5 FPS and
13 FPS for Google Nexus S and Samsung Galaxy S3, respectively.
For single-thread encoding/decoding version, we found that the
throughput bottleneck becomes the encoding time at the sender-
end for higher QR versions in the Samsung Galaxy S3 case.
Fortunately, most latest mainstream smartphones are equipped
with multi-core CPUs, for instance, iPhone 4S is armed with a
dual-core CPU and Galaxy S3 is armed with a quad-core CPU.
To explore the benefit of multi-core CPUs, we deploy multiple en-
coding/decoding threads. On Galaxy S3, with 3 encoding threads,
the amortized encoding time for QR version 20 is reduced under
90 ms, which is sufficient to send 10 QR codes per second. At the
receiver end, once a frame image is captured by the camera, the
receiver first uses our fast QR filter to remove the duplicated QR
frames and non-QR frames. The filtered image will be pushed into
the decoding queue to be decoded by multiple decoding threads.
Because small camera preview image size leads to higher cam-
era capture rate and lower CPU usage, our system uses adaptive
camera preview image resolutions ranging from 192 × 144 to
800× 600 for different QR versions. We tested the QR streaming
throughput on both Google Nexus S and Samsung Galaxy S3 from
QR version 5 to 20. As illustrated in the right bar chart of Fig. 6,
the channel throughput for Samsung Galaxy S3 reaches its peak at
70 kbps with QR version 19. The throughput bottleneck switches
from the frame refresh cap to the limited computation resource
after QR version 18, and that’s why the throughput starts to drop
after version 20. On Nexus S, it can only decode the QR codes up
to version 15 due to its poor front-facing camera resolution; thus
its maximum throughput is below 20 kbps.
5 THE PROPOSED SBVLC SCHEMES
In this section, we first study the properties of various physical
security techniques. We then specially tailor our SBVLC schemes
to utilize those underlying security techniques and boost their
effectiveness.
5.1 The underlying security techniques
Limiting visible angle. Here, we discuss some physical protection
approaches based on limiting visible angle. One simple and effec-
tive security protection approach is visual angle blocking. In fact,
with the designed working distance, the receiver (smartphone)
already blocks about 2× 30◦ viewing angle of the sender’s screen
during the communication. The users can also utilise the existing
sheltering items/objects round the communication place such as
walls, bodes or ground. (c.f. Fig. 9, left.) If the sender’s screen is
facing and close to a non-reflecting solid wall, it is easy to keep







Fig. 9: Physical security approaches: visual angle blocking, rota-
tion and privacy screen projector.
As discussed above, the security of a VLC channel largely
depends on the screen visible angle. Therefore, another effective
protection approach is to minimize the screen visible angle. One
opinion is to use privacy screen projector (a.k.a. screen privacy
filter), e.g. [13], which is widely available in current market.
According to [13], the contrast ratio drops to nearly 0 when the
viewing angle is larger than 60◦. It means that the maximum
visible angle is 2θ = 120◦ for a screen equipped with a privacy
screen projector. The right set of pictures in Fig. 9 shows our
experiment results on Nexus S with 3M privacy screen projector.
The top smartphones are equipped screen privacy projector, and
the bottom ones are without privacy screen projector. From left
to right, the pictures are taken with viewing angles 0◦, 30◦ and
60◦ respectively. Note that the usability of a legitimate receiver is
not effected, for the privacy screen projector has negligible effect
when the viewing angle is small. Our experimental validation
confirms that the screen visible angle of a smartphone with privacy
screen projector is around 120◦, which gives ε ≈ 30◦.
Proactive rotation mechanism. In the scenario where there is
no proper sheltering objects, the users can still utilize the mobility
of the smartphones to enhance the system security. Proactive
rotation is a good user-induced motion to prevent the adversary
from ‘seeing’ all the barcode frames. (We will later show how
to amplify the security in Sec. 5.3 and Sec. 5.4 if the adversary
misses at least one barcode frame.) Before that, we would like to
provide some impossibility results in case that an eavesdropper
with two of more optical receivers can predict the VLC event
place and setup his/her receivers in optimal positions. It is easy to
see that the optimal adversarial strategy against proactive rotation
should always be distributing his/her receivers uniformly over the
360◦ cycle. In App. A, we show that if β0+β1 ≥ 2ε, there exists
optimal receiver positions such that the screen is always visible to
the adversary regardless the screen orientation. (c.f. Thm. A.2.)
Note that the visible angles of latest smartphone screens
are close to 180◦. Therefore, if the adversary can predict the
communicating smartphone screen position, he/she can easily
eavesdrop the communication with two receivers. Therefore, the
confidentiality cannot be preserved in the presence of an adversary
who has two (or more) receivers at optimal positions. However, the
communication place is hard to predict in most smartphone VLC
case due to its mobility. So we assume that it is difficult for a the
adversary to setup his/her devices at optimal positions in priori.
We reduce any non-optimal multi-receiver adversary to a single-
receiver adversary, whose device is modelled as the minimum ball
that contains those receivers. Hence, we will only analyse security
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Fig. 10: Two-phase message transfer scheme.
Let the adversarial capture cone aperture be 2β, and let the screen
visible angle be 2θmax. As demonstrated in the middle of Fig. 9,
the users have to rotate the screen ω > 2(β + θmax) + µ angle
in order to ensure that the adversary cannot ‘see’ the screen for
a moment, where µ is the additional rotation angle to guarantees
that there is at least one barcode frame refreshed while rotating µ
angle. Therefore, the rotation time for angle µ should be at least
2
τf
, where τf is the system frame refresh rate. We can calculate
the total rotation time for a given rotation speed ρ as follows:
t =









Although the rotation speed does not effect the total rotation time,
the higher speed leads to the larger rotation angle µ. In practice,
there is a trade-off between the rotation time and rotation angle
and one can derivative the optimal rotation speed based on his/her
preference.
5.2 Two-phase message transfer scheme
After building a high-throughput real-time VLC channel, we are
ready to focus on the security aspects. In particular, we are going
to show that the communication system can achieve much higher
security level once it has a duplex VLC channel. Consider the
following scenario: Bob wants to share dozens of his contacts
with his friend Alice. VLC seems to be an adequate tool to
accomplish this task, because it is extremely simple to setup.
However, an eavesdropper can shoulder sniff all the information
if he/she can ‘see’ Bob’s smartphone screen. To overcome this
security issue, we propose the first scheme of SBVLC: two-phase
message transfer scheme.
Protocol design. By combining two opposite-directional one-
way screen-camera VLC channels, we can enable a fully duplex
two-way VLC channel such that both smartphones are able to
‘talk’ to each other at the same time. We utilize this feature to
construct a more secure message transfer protocol as follows. Let
`p be the payload capacity of a single barcode. The sender first
divides the data into n chunks with size `p. Fig. 10 shows the
high-level data flow of our two-phase message transfer scheme,
where the sender wants to send the receiver one data chunk
Mi ∈ {0, 1}`p . They do the following steps: (1) The receiver
first randomly picks Ri ← {0, 1}`p and sends Ri to the sender
through the receiver-sender VLC channel; (2) The sender fetches
Ri and sends Ci := Mi ⊕ Ri to the receiver through the sender-
receiver VLC channel; (3) The receiver fetches Ci and returns










































Fig. 11: Lazy decoding technique.
Naively, both smartphones can invoke the above procedure n
times to send n data chunks. For i ∈ [n], both the sender and
receiver set a counter ctr = i and put the counter in the frame
header while transferring the i-th data chunk. The receiver first
encodes the i-th random frame to a barcode and displays it on its
screen. Meanwhile, the receiver keeps checking each frame image
captured by the camera, trying to decode a new incoming barcode.
Once Ci is received, the receiver extracts Mi = Ci ⊕ Ri and
repeats the same procedure for data chunk Mi+1. Similarly, the
sender tries to decode a incoming barcode for Ri. Upon success,
the sender encodes Ci =Mi⊕Ri to a barcode and displays it on
its screen. After that, the sender is waiting for the next incoming
barcode. In such way, for QR version j, transferring each data
chunk Mi takes
t(j) = 2 ∗ (tenc(j) + tdec(j)) + tdelay ,
where tenc(j) and tdec(j) are the running time of encoding and
decoding for QR version j and tdelay is the system delay.
To improve the performance, we propose the lazy decoding
technique as shown in Fig. 11. First of all, since the random frames
are independent to the messages, the receiver can prepare the QR
codes for random frames during any spare time or even offline.
Secondly, we notice that the QR decoding success rate is very
high; and thus the image can usually be decoded once it passes
our fast QR filter. Therefore, upon receiving a NewBarcode, the
receiver can first display the prepared QR code for the next random
frame and then try to decode the NewBarcode. If decoding fails,
the receiver can simply set the counter ctr of the next random
frame to be the missing sequence number, and the sender will try
to send the indicated data chunk again. After decoding, the re-
ceiver first recovers the message and then prepare the random QR
for the next round. The simplified sender and receiver algorithms
are described in Alg. 2 and Alg. 3. By applying our lazy decoding
technique, the system takes
t(j) = tenc(j) + tdec(j) + tdelay
to transfer each data chunk.
User interface design. We put a small camera preview win-
dow at the top of the screen to help the user to quickly align
two smartphones such that both QR frame areas are captured by
each others’ front-facing cameras. Once the alignment is done,
the preview window is shadowed at the beginning of the data
transmission due to security concerns. (c.f. Sec. 5.2) Alternatively,
Algorithm 2: Sender(M)
M1, . . . ,Mn ← Split(M);
for i← 1 to n do
while No NewBarcode detected do
Obtain camera preview image;
Ri ← decode(NewBarcode); Ci =Mi ⊕Ri;




$← {0, 1}`p ; F1 ← encode(R1); display(F1);
R2
$← {0, 1}`p ; F2 ← encode(R2);
for i← 2 to n+ 1 do
while No NewBarcode detected do
Obtain camera preview image;
display(Fi);
Ci−1 ← decode(NewBarcode);
Mi−1 = Ci−1 ⊕Ri−1;
if i ≤ n then
Ri+1
$← {0, 1}`p ; Fi+1 ← encode(Ri+1);
return M =M1|| . . . ||Mn;
we can also blur the preview images on the fly such that the
preview images can still assistant users for alignment but the
blurred QR codes in the preview window can’t be decoded. Hence,
we can keep the blurred preview all the time during the whole pro-
cess. However, we found that the real-time blurring process leads
significant computational overhead, and subsequently it effects
the performance in current smartphone environment. Therefore,
we prefer the shadowing based solution. The screen layout is
shown in Fig. 12, and two smartphones are expected to be in
opposite direction during a communication. Our experiment shows
this alignment can minimise the image distortion caused by the
viewing angle, and thus the system is more robust.
Security analysis. It is easy to see that the distribution of Ri
is independent to Mi; in addition, Ci itself does not reveal any
information about Mi, that is
∀c : Pr[Mi = m|Ci = c] = Pr[Mi = m] .
Therefore, the eavesdropper has to ‘see’ both screens in order
to recover the message Mi; however, the time interval between
sending Ri and Ci is only a few milliseconds. We can consider
Front camera preview
(It will blackout when 
the transmission starts)
QR frame area















Fig. 13: Security of Two-phase Message Transfer.
both smartphones are sending the corresponding QR code at
roughly the same time.
We can show that our two-phase message transfer scheme
preserves the confidentiality of the transmitted data string against
single-point adversaries in distance. Recall that ‘visibility’ is
defined as the intersection between the adversarial capture cone
and the visible zone(s). As depicted in the left of Fig. 13, the
distance between two smartphones is around 10 cm, and we
define the middle of two phones as the origin. An eavesdrop-
per must be in the shadowed area in order to simultaneously
‘see’ both phone screens. We bound this shadowed area as a
minimum ball B(O, dsave), where dsave = 5tan(ε) cm. Hence,
∀a0 /∈ B(O, dsave), a0 cannot be in both visual zones simul-
taneously, In other word, if the single-point adversary is more
than dsave-distance away, then the data confidentiality is preserved.
Plugging in the widest smartphone screen visible angle, ε = 2◦,
we have dsave ≈ 143 cm. It means that all the single-point
adversaries who are more than 1.4 m away cannot eavesdrop the
message regardless the quality of their optical devices. On the
other hand, any adversary within the range can be easily detected
by the user in most circumstances.
If the smartphones are equipped the privacy screen projectors
as mentioned in Sec. 5.1, the system achieves much stronger
security guarantees. When ε = 30◦, we have dsave ≈ 8.66 cm. It
is almost impossible for an adversary to be in this range without
being noticed in practice. Fig. 14 illustrates our experiment vali-
dation of the security guarantees, and there exists no angle such
that the camera can ‘see’ both screen simultaneously in about 1
foot distance. In general, SBVLC is secure against an adversary
Fig. 14: Eavesdropping experiment on smartphones equipped with
privacy screen projectors.






< ε ≈ 30◦ .
When dsave << d, we can approximate d ≈ d − dsave; thus the
system can tolerate any single-receiver adversary with β < 30◦.
In App. A, we also generalize the result to the 3D case. (c.f.
Thm. A.3, below.)
Implementation and performance. Using fully duplex VLC
channel, our two-phase message transfer scheme naturally con-
firms message delivery, so that we don’t need a frame refresh cap
to avoid missing QR frames. The scheme requires that both the
sender-receiver and receiver-sender VLC channels, so its compu-
tational requirement is nearly twice higher than the conventional
one-way message transfer. The left chart in Fig. 15 shows the
average time taken for one data chunk transfer on Galaxy S3 and
Nexus S. In the Galaxy S3 case, the average time is between 150
and 200 ms for low QR versions, and it grows gradually as long
with the increase of QR versions. The maximum communication
throughputs is above 10 kbps in the Galaxy S3 case, and the reason
why the throughput drops quickly for higher QR versions is due
to the difficulty of stable alignment for both smartphones, which
costs the decrease of decoding success rate. Due to lazy decoding
technique, when the decoding success rate is low, the amortized
transfer time gets longer quickly.
Remark. This scheme can be also used for mobile payment
systems, where one party is a smartphone and another is a
terminal equipped with a screen and camera, e.g. the users can
securely ‘show’ their movie tickets to the terminal. In those usage
scenarios, only a little bandwidth is required. Hence, the current
system throughput is sufficient in practice. If we only add privacy
screen projector at terminal side, we can compute the safe distance
dsave ≈ 17 cm, which is promising to protect the tickets from
shoulder sniffing.
The system throughput depends on 3 important factors: a)
the smartphone front-facing camera capture rate, b) the encod-
ing/decoding time and c) the storage capacity per single barcode.
Hence a smartphone with high camera capture rate may lead to
high throughput, for example it was said that iPhone 4S running
on iOS 5 can capture up to 60 FPS; however, iOS 6 limits the
maximum camera capture rate to be 30 FPS. In theory, we expect
better throughput on iOS devices if we can remove this limitation.
In terms of barcode scheme, since QR code is not specifically
designed for smartphone environment, its encoding/decoding run-
ning time is relatively high for legacy devices. Considering that
the frame refresh rate is limited by the camera capture rate, we
have to increase the storage capacity per single barcode in order
to improve the system throughput. As future work, we would
like to replace QR codes with color barcodes [6] for shorter
encoding/decoding time and higher storage capacity. It uses mul-
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Fig. 15: Two-phase Transfer Performance.
tiple colors for each information block, so it can encode more
information than the a mono-color QR code does. For instance,
the storage capacity of a single color barcode for the 1280× 720
resolution screen of Galaxy S3 with 7×7-pixel block size is about
34K bit. According to [6] the encoding/decoding time is less 20
ms, which is significantly faster than QR codes. We estimate that
our system is able to reach above 200 kbps throughput if it adopts
color barcode as its coding scheme.
5.3 Smartphone handshake scheme
In this section, we are going to deal with those adversaries whose
β ≥ ε. To preserve data confidentiality against such strong
adversaries, we would like to use the standard key-exchange-
then-encrypt paradigm. Namely, the sender and the receiver first
negotiate a common secret key, and then they use the secret key to
encrypt the communication channel with some stream cipher, say
Salsa20. Note that the common secret key can be used in many
other applications as a substitution of the conventional public-key
based key exchange protocol.
Protocol design. We now present our key exchange protocol
for smartphones, called smartphone handshake scheme that runs
between two parties (smartphones) Alice and Bob, and they will
establish a common secret key after the execution. We want to de-
sign a lightweight scheme that does not rely on any cryptographic
Alice Bob
A0
$← {0, 1}`; A0||0
`
−−−−→ B0,Kb0 $← {0, 1}`;
C0||B0←−−−− C0 = A0 ⊕Kb0;
Kb0 = A0 ⊕ C0;





Di = Bi−1 ⊕Kai ;
Ai||Di−−−−→ Bi,Kbi $← {0, 1}`;
Ci||Bi←−−−− Ci = Ai ⊕Kbi ;
Kbi = Ai ⊕ Ci; Kai = Bi−1 ⊕Di;
h
$← H; h−→
Return sk = h(Ka1 , . . . ,Kan,Kb0, . . . ,Kbn);
Fig. 16: Smartphone handshake scheme.
assumptions.2 A typical key exchange scheme between Alice and
Bob requires both parties to contribute key material, so we modify
the package format to have two payload slots, as depicted above.
The high level protocol is described in Fig. 16. The main idea
is as the follows. Bob utilizes the two-phase message transfer





to Alice using payload-
A; meanwhile, Alice is also sending her key material {Kai }ni=1
to Bob using payload-B. At the end, Alice picks a universal hash
h
$← H and sends it to Bob. Both parties return their common
secret key as




0, . . . ,K
b
n) .
After the common sk is established, Alice and Bob can use it
to encrypt the one-way VLC channel. Alternatively, it can be used
to pair two devices, e.g. Bluetooth.
Security analysis. The scheme should be combined with
proactive rotation mechanism to enhance its security. First of
all, we show that the rotation based protection approach is much
more effective in our scheme, comparing with the standard one-
way VLC case mentioned in Sec. 5.1. Recall we have to rotate
ω > 2(β+θmax)+µ = 180
◦+2(β−ε)+µ in the standard one-
way VLC case. In our scheme, the adversary has to simultaneously
‘see’ both screens in order to extract the information. As illustrated
in right of Fig. 13, since the adversarial capture cone must have
intersection with both visible zones, when the rotation angle
ω′ > 2(β − ε) + µ the adversary must lose vision of one of the
screens at some moment. Therefore, the users are able to achieve
the same security level as in the standard one-way VLC case with
180◦ less rotation.
Next, we show that if the established key has enough entropy
to any eavesdroppers who fail to capture at least one frame from
either side of the screen. The min-entropy of a random variable
X is defined as H∞(X)
def
= − log(maxx Pr[X = x]). If an
eavesdropper misses one frame, he/she cannot obtain a pair of
(Kai ,K
b
i ) for some i ∈ [n]. The length of (Kai ,Kbi ) is 2`
bits, so the min-entropy of the key materials is at least 2` bits
to the eavesdropper. The famous leftover hash lemma [14] states
that universal hash functions are good randomness extractors to
produce a 2 ∗ `+  nearly bits with entropy 2` from a long input
string with min-entropy 2` bits. According to leftover hash lemma,
if the hash function h is randomly picked from the universal hash
2. Diffie-Hellman key exchange will be immediately broken once we have
large enough quantum computer.
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function family H, then the entropy of sk is nearly 2` bits to the
eavesdropper.
Implementation and performance. In practice, we only need
to establish 128- or 256-bit key, so the communication throughput
is not crucial for the smartphone handshake scheme. Using QR
versions 3 and 4, we can support maximum ` = 196 and 296 bits,
respectively. When ` is longer than the key length, say 128, we
can use a simple algorithm to extract randomness instead of the
universal hash, i.e.
sk = (⊕ni=1Kai )⊕ (⊕nj=0Kbj ) .
In terms of user-induced rotation motion, if the rotation speed
is ρ, then in order to guarantee security, the users have to rotate
ω > 2(β − ε) + 2ρτf . For instance, let τf = 5 FPS, ε = 2◦
and β = 30◦, we can obtain the angle and time trade-off chart as
shown in Fig. 18. For example, if a user rotates at speed 40 degrees
per second, he/she has to rotate 72◦, which takes 1.8 seconds to
finish; whereas, if a user rotates at speed 10 degrees per second,
he/she only needs to rotate 60◦ but it takes 6 seconds. On the other
hand, a user may always rotate a certain angle ω∗ at certain speed
ρ∗ in practice, and we can deduce the system security level from
ω∗ and ρ∗.
5.4 All-or-nothing data streaming scheme
In some scenarios where the data string to be transferred is short,
so it is not economical to setup a key first. However, one might
still want to achieve higher security level. We need a scheme that
allows the users to directly transmit the data without key exchange
step while still offers high security guarantees. In this section,
we propose the all-or-nothing data streaming scheme, which is
specifically tailored for secure temporary data transfer without key
exchange phase.
Protocol design. The aim of this scheme is to amplify the
security such that the confidentiality of the entire transmitted data
is guaranteed if the eavesdropper fails to capture at least one data
frame. To achieve this goal, the sender first picks a random key
and encrypts its data. Then the sender splits the key into many
key shares and gradually sends those key shares together with the
encrypted data chunks frame by frame. If the adversary miss one
frame, then he/she cannot recover the key; subsequently, he/she
cannot decrypt the captured data.
To achieve this spacial security feature, we would like to
employ an all-or-nothing transformation. As usual, we split the
data into n chucks of length `-bit, denoted as M1, . . . ,Mn.
Let PRF : {0, 1}`k × {0, 1}λ 7→ {0, 1}` be a pseudo-random
function that takes input as a key K ∈ {0, 1}`k and an λ-bit
string, and outputs an `-bit pseudo-random string. As shown in
Fig. 17, the sender first picks a random key sk $← {0, 1}`k , and
then it masks the data chunks by computing
Ui = PRF(sk, i)⊕Mi
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. It then computeUn+1 = sk⊕h(U1, . . . , Un),
where h : {0, 1}∗ 7→ {0, 1}`k is a cryptographic hash and is
viewed as a random oracle. The sender then invokes two-phase
message transfer protocol to send U1, . . . , Un+1 to the receiver.
After receiving all the data, the receiver first recovers the secret
key sk = Un+1 ⊕ h(U1, . . . , Un) and then recovers the data as
Mi = Ui ⊕ PRF(sk, i) for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Security analysis. Analogously, we use proactive rotation
based protection approach to ensure that the eavesdropper misses
Receiver Sender
sk
$← {0, 1}`k ;
For i = 1, . . . , n do:
Ri
$← {0, 1}`; Ri−−→ Ui = PRF(sk, i)⊕Mi;
Fi←− Fi = Ri ⊕ Ui;
Ui = Ri ⊕ Fi;
Rn+1
$← {0, 1}`k ; Rn+1−−−→ Un+1 = sk ⊕ h(U1 . . . Un)
Fn+1←−−− Fn+1 = Rn+1 ⊕ Un+1;
Un+1 = Rn+1 ⊕ Fn+1
sk = Un+1 ⊕ h(U1 . . . Un);
For i ∈ [n], return Mi = Ui ⊕ PRF(sk, i);
Fig. 17: All-or-nothing data streaming scheme.
at least one frame. If the adversary misses the last frame, i.e.
Un+1, then she does not know sk. Since Mi is masked with a
pseudo-random string, the adversary cannot learn anything from
Ui. On the other hand, if the adversary misses Uj for some
j ∈ [n], then she cannot recover sk from Un+1 either. This
is because h behaves as a random oracle and the adversary
cannot guess h(U1, . . . , Un) without knowing Uj . To sum up,
the confidentiality of all the data chunks is preserved.
Implementation and performance. The performance of our
all-or-nothing data streaming scheme is very similar to the two-
phase message transfer scheme. We use AES-128 as the PRF and
truncated SHA-1 as the hash function h. Since all the underlying
cryptographic primitives are light-weight, the entire scheme is
highly efficient. Compared with the aforementioned standard two-
phase message transfer protocol, the communication overhead of
this scheme is just one additional frame transmission.
6 COMPATIBILITY, USABILITY AND ROBUSTNESS
We tested the compatibility of SBVLC on iPhone 4/4S/5 and
many Android smartphone platforms in various environments such
as indoor, outdoor. The experiment shows that SBVLC works
seamlessly across platforms under different lighting conditions.
In terms of usability, we found that the rotation task is hard if two
users hold their own phones and try to accomplish the rotation in a
collaborative manor. The challenge is brought by maintaining the
alignment of those two smartphones such that they are able to ‘see’
each other’s barcode during the rotation. However, it is easy for
a person to accomplish the rotation task if he/she holds these two
smartphones in his/her both hands respectively. For instance, one
can easily keep his/her upper body still and rotate his/her waist
for a 90◦-rotation task. We tested our system on 40 candidates
randomly selected from the campus. Tbl. 1 shows the average
time taken by a user to align two smartphones such that both
phones can ‘see’ the other’s barcode at the first attempt and after
5-min training. Typically, it takes longer for a user to align two
smartphones that are in different size and sharp such as the iPhone
TABLE 1: The average time to align two smartphones for SBVLC
communication.
Study case First attempt After training
Galaxy S3 - Galaxy S3 5′′ 2′′
iPhone 4S - iPhone 4S 6′′ 2′′
iPhone 4S - Galaxy S3 14′′ 3′′
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Fig. 18: Rotation angle and time trade-off.
4S-Galaxy S3 pair, but it becomes easier once the users get used to
it. Given our single-person rotation instructions, 97.5% candidates
can accomplish the 90◦-rotation task within the first 2 attempts.
In terms of system robustness, since our focus is data confi-
dentiality against eavesdropping, the scenarios where a barcode
itself contains malicious information, e.g. URL, are orthogonal
to this work. Many other active attacks, e.g. data modification
and injection can be easily detected if the attack devices are near
or in between the victims’ smartphones; on the other hand, it is
hard to implant a fake barcode from distance, for majority of the
receiver’s camera view is occupied/blocked by the sender’s screen.
We performed various jamming attacks to test the robustness of
SBVLC. For instance, we use a laser pointer to shoot the receiver’s
camera at different angles. As shown in Fig. 19, the laser beam
does not effect our system when the shooting angle is ≥ 60◦. On
the flip side, the shooting angle can’t be≤ 30◦ in practice, because
of the angle blocking by the other smartphone. In general, due
to the usage of visible light, the jamming attacks can be easily
detected and avoided, utilising the mobility of smartphones or
physical blocking.
7 RELATED WORK
Smartphones are widely used to scan 1D or 2D barcodes, such
as UPC code, QR codes and Data Matrix. QR Droid [15] is a
smartphone App related to this work. In QR Droid, the sender
phone encodes a short message into a QR code and displays on
its screen; the receiver uses its camera to capture the QR code and
decodes it back to the message. The message can be encrypted
with DES algorithm under a common secret key configured by
both parties. However, there is no automatic key exchange step
in the implementation of QR Droid. In terms of barcode design,
by taking advantage of more colors, some new color barcodes are
proposed to increase the capacity, e.g., high capacity color bar-
code (HCCB) [16]. 4D barcode [5] is recently proposed for robust
data transmission between smartphones. However, its throughput
on smartphone platforms is as little as 100 bits/s due to the heavy
computational overhead of operations like border detection and
barcode rectification. PixNet [17] can build a wireless link using
LCDs and cameras. The system can achieve high throughput
over a long distance based on orthogonal frequency division
multiplexing (OFDM) and complex computer vision algorithms.
Unfortunately, PixNet is not suitable for smartphones due to
its high computation overhead. COBRA system [6] can achieve

























Fig. 19: Jamming experiment. (Tested on Galaxy S3.)
high speed barcode streaming between smartphones based on
lightweight image processing techniques. But it improves system
throughput by using highly customized barcodes, which are not
widely adopted in practice. Moreover, the security of barcodes-
based communication is not studied in [6]. Several recent studies
have utilized barcode based out-of-band channels as security
enhancement primitives. For example, McCune et al. proposed the
Seeing-is-believing (SiB) system [18] for human authentication. It
also can be used for secure device pairing [19]. Kainda et al. [20]
also formally studied the usability and security of human involved
out-of-band channels for device pairing. Similar, QR-TAN [21]
was proposed to use QR codes as a VLC channel for transaction
authentication. However, these studies only employ barcode-based
VLC channels to as some building blocks, and they do not address
the security of the barcode-based VLC channels themselves.
8 CONCLUSION
We proposed SBVLC, utilizing a fully duplex smartphone VLC
channel based on 2D barcode. On top of the duplex VLC channel,
we further propose three secure communication schemes. All
SBVLC schemes are evaluated through extensive experiments
on Android smartphones, and the results show that our system
achieves high level security and NFC-comparable throughput. The
system can be used for private information sharing, secure device
pairing and secure mobile payment, etc. To our best knowledge,
this work is the first one that formally defines and studies the
security of a smartphone VLC system. It serves as a milestone
for further development in secure VLC systems for smartphones.
In future work, we would like to increase the system throughput,
using color barcode streaming [6] as discussed in Sec. 5.2. We
will also extend our system to support other mobile and portable
devices, e.g. laptops and tablets.
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APPENDIX
Theorem A.1. In the 2D model, if γ < 2θmax, for a screen with
visible angle 2θmax, there exists a∗ such that
Advs(a
∗, β0 + β1 + γ) ≡ Advm(a0, β0,a1, β1, γ) .
Proof We want to show that a two-receiver adversary
Advm(a0, β0,a1, β1, γ) is equivalent to a single-receiver ad-



















(b) 3D optimal positions.
Fig. 20: Optimal positions for two-receiver adversary.
adversary who uses additional devices to fill the blind spot
between those two adversarial capture cone, so that he/her can
also capture the source beam from the screen that falls into the
gap. This modified adversary has a continuous capture aperture
β0 + β1 + γ, so he/she can be considered as a single-receiver
adversary Advs(a∗, β0 + β1 + γ), where a∗ lies on the angle
bisector. We need to show that this modified adversary has the
same capture capability as the original two-receiver adversary.
Indeed, they are different if and only if there exists v such
that the visible zone Vis2(v, ε) has intersection with the gap
but has no intersection with either capture cones c2(a0, β0) or
c2(a1, β1). Since γ < 2θmax, such v does not exist. Hence,
Advs(a
∗, β0 + β1 + γ) ≡ Advm(a0, β0,a1, β1, γ) as claimed.
Theorem A.2. In 2D model, if β0+ β1 > 2ε, for all v, the screen
pl(v) with visible angle 2θmax = 180◦ − 2ε is visible by
the two-receiver adversary Advm(a0, β0,a1, β1, γ), where
the line a0-a1 passes through the origin O.
Proof As shown in Fig. 20 (a), when the line a0-a1 passes
through the origin O, we have γ0 = γ1 due to its symmetry.
Given β0 + β1 > 2ε, we can deduce that
γ0 = γ1 =
360◦ − 2(β0 + β1)
2
< 180◦ − 2ε = 2θmax .
According to Thm. A.1, we can reduce both cases
Advm(a0, β0,a1, β1, γ0) and Advm(a0, β0,a1, β1, γ1) to the
single-receiver adversaries. Subsequently, the adversary can cover
the entire 360◦ cycle, so the screen pl(v) is always visible to the
adversary for all v.
We now show that similar result holds in the 3D model as
well. (cf. Fig. 20 (b).) Recall that the visibility is defined as
the intersection between the screen visible zone Vis3(v) and the
adversarial capture cones. It is easy to see that
∀v ∈ R3 : Vis3(v, ε) ∩ (c3(a0, β0) ∪ c3(a1, β1)) 6= ∅ .
Hence, the screen is always visible by the adversary.
Theorem A.3. ∀a ∈ R3, the (a, β)-single-receiver adversary with
β < ε is not capable of eavesdropping any information about
the data transmitted by the two-phase message transfer scheme
(c.f. Alg. 2 and Alg. 3).
Proof Since the visibility is defined as the intersection between
screen visual zones and the adversarial capture cone. It is easy
to see that when β < ε the adversarial capture cone c3(a, β)
cannot simultaneously intersect with both screen visible zones
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Vis3(v0, ε) and Vis3(v1, ε), where v0 = −v1. Therefore, at
least one of the two phone screens is invisible to the adversary at
any given time, so the claim holds for all a ∈ R3.
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